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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALLI SMITH GIRARD, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cross Appellant, 
CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., CATHERINE 
APPLEBY, DON BJARNSON, and GRACE 
BJARNSON, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPELLANT'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 17662 
COME NOW the Defendants, Appellants, and Cross Respon-
dents Charles L. Appleby, Jr., Catherine R, Appleby, Don Bjarnson 
and Grace Bjarnson, his wife, by and through their attorney, 
Michael D. Hughes, and petition the Court, pursuant to Rule 
76(e) (1), for a rehearing on one point which petitioners believe 
may not have been addressed or resolved by the Court in its 
opinion dated March 11, 1983. 
The only point upon which petitioners seek a rehearing 
arises from the first full paragraph of the second page of the 
Court's opinion, which reads as follows: 
On this appeal, defendants challenge the 
award cf attorney fees, contending that the court erred 
in reopening the case sua sponte for the purpose of 
permitting Girard to submit evidence omitted at the 
time of trial. Girard cross appeals, contending that 
the court erred in refusing to consider waste and 
health code violations as further evidence of breach, 
and that the court erred in denying her motion to amend 
the complaint at the time of trial, and erred in ruling 
that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acceptance 
of rent. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Peti ti one rs believe, by reason of the testimony gi_ven at tna 
and Point VI addressed in their original Brief on Api:;eal, that 
this paragraph should have read as follows: 
On this appeal, defendants challenge the 
award cf attorney fees, contending that the court erred 
in reopening the case sua spcnte for the purpose of 
permitting Girard to submit evidence cmi tted at the 
time cf trial and in denying Defendants' attorney's 
fees in sustaining the lease against the remaining 
plaintiff, as testified to at trial by Defendants' 
counsel. Girard cross appeals, contending that the 
court erred in refusing to consider waste and health 
code violations as further evidence of breach, and that 
the court erred in denying her motion to amend the 
complaint at the time of trial, and erred in rulinq 
that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acce~tance 
of rent. 
Pe ti ti one rs are unsure whether the underscored inser· 
tion was addressed by the Court. Petitioners' oral argument 
before the Court did not stress this matter, al though it was 
clearly raised in Petitioners' brief. It may be, however, that 
the Court impliedly ruled on the above in its final paragraph in 
the opinion which states as follows: 
The trial court's award of attorney fees is vacat-
ed and set aside. In all other respects, the judgment 
is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs. 
Nonetheless, it is unclear from the text whether the Court d~ 
intend to resolve Point VI raised in Appellants' Brief regardi~ 
the defendants' attorney's fees by inference in the abon 
summation. 
,,.--, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this.U-day of March, 1983. 
MICHAEL D. HUG ES 
At~orney for Petitioners 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALLI SMITH GIRARD, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cross Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
FOR PETITION ON 
REHEARING 
CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., CATHERINE 
APPLEBY' DON BJARNSON' and GRACE 
BJARNSON, 
Case No. 17662 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross Respondents. 
BRIEF FOR PETITION ON REHEARING 
Nature of Case 
The nature of the case was accurately recited by Chief 
Justice Hall in his opinion dated March 11, 1983, attached hereto 
as an appendix, with the exception noted in the Petition for 
Rehearing, ante. 
Disposition in the Trial Court 
As it pertains to this petition for rehearing, the 
trial court denied appellants' attorney's fees as testified to at 
trial. 
Relief Sought by this Petition 
In appellants' initial brief on appeal, the issue of 
appellants' attorney's fees as testified to at trial was covered 
in Point VI of appellants' brief. The relief sought by this 
petition for rehearing is to seek the award of those attorney's 
fees or a clarification of those reasons supporting their denial. 
-3-
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Petitioners fully understand that the Court, in its discretion, 
may deny their petition. 
STATEMEN'r OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking a forfeiture of 
a lease on certain heated mineral waters operated by defendant, 
as a recreational and therapeutic spa. As set forth if' plc.in-
tif f's complaint, plaintiffs' single claim for forfeiture wa, 
defendants' 
ises. On 
failure to maintain liabi li tv insurance on the prem-
the morning cf trial plaintiff Salli Smith Girard 
sought to try issues of health code violations not properly ple~ 
and which were not tried with the consent of the defendants. 
Although the trial court reserved its ruling on the propriety o'. 
trying these unplead issues, the trial court nonetheless allowed 
plaintiff to introduce testimony and evidence in support of these 
claims, over the continuing objection of defendants. Most of t~ 
four-day trial time was consumed by these alleged heal th code 
violations which were based upon information tendered to appel-
lants and filed with the trial court on the morning of trial. 
Although the trial court allowed testimony and evidence pertai~ 
ing to these heal th code violations, after the trial the court 
ultimately sustained appellants' objections and excluded from its 
ruling all matters pertaining to causes not formally raised by 
the pleadings and not tried by consent. 
Paragraph 12 of the lease in 
attorney's fees, apparently either in 
question provided for 
the enforcement of the 
terms of the lease itself or in the exercise of any rights or 
remedies contained in the lease or otherwise provided for by law. 
-4-
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Jl.s found by the lower court, the trial of issues improperly 
brought before it consumed most of the trial time, the trial of 
such issues not being consented to by the defendants. 
l~irard v. Ap~, No. 17662, filed March 11, 1983, at 3-4, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". In point of fact the appellants, 
defendants below, contended throughout the trial that the les-
sors' acceptance of over $22,000 in rents made the maintenance of 
such an action for forfeiture superfluous in light of this 
Court's earlier declarations in Woodland Theaters, Inc., v. ABC 
Intermountain Theaters, Inc., 560 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977) and 
Brigham Young Trust Company v. Wagener, 13 Utah 236, 44 P. 1030 
(1896). At the end of the trial in which the lease was sustained 
and after appellants had finished rebuttal of the plaintiff's 
case, appellants' counsel was sworn and did testify as to an 
attorney's fee of $2,000 in defending the lease from forfeiture. 
See partial transcript at 92:18-93:2. 
BASIS FOR PETITION 
POINT I 
IT rs UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT 
ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF APPEL-
LANTS' ATTORNEY'S FEES AS TESTIFIED TO BEFORE 
THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Petitioners fully understand that several points raised 
in their appeal were resolved in terms of substance by the 
Court's ruling as set forth in the attached opinion. For exam-
ple, it is clear once the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 
determination that the amendment seeking to implead new issues 
-5-
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was properly disallowed, the fact that those issues might other-
wise constitute harmless error was a matter this Court need net 
decide. In its opinion, however, this Court did not direct;.; 
address the issue of appellants' attorney's fees which had be~ 
testified to at trial. The facts upon which the appellants 
believe that these fees are justified were set forth in Point ~ 
of appellants' brief, at pp. 36-69. That point is reproducec 
verbatim herein as follows: 
POINT VI 
THE COURT' S DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS/ APPELLANTS' 
ATTORNEY'S FEE IN TRYING IN LARGE PART ISSUES NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND IN SUCCESSFULLY 
RESISTING FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE WAS IMPROPER, 
SUCH FEES HAVING BEEN TESTIFIED TO AND BEING 
ALLOWABLE PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW. 
The court indicates that the rationale behind the 
sua sponte motion to reopen and accept affidavits on 
attorney's fees as being the confusion which resulted 
from the uncertainty which existed as to the triable 
issues caused by Respondent's own counsel. During the 
trial, Respondent Girard made several attempts to amend 
the complaint and add additional causes of action, most 
of which had occurred long after the suit was ini ti-
ated. Although the court noted Appellants' continuing 
objections to all testimony pertaining to matter out-
side of the relevant insurance questions, it allowed 
such testimony to enter into the record and reserved 
its ruling on those issues until judgment. As a re-
sult, the Appellants spent a large part of the trial 
defending the lease and forfeiture thereof by resisting 
issues not properly before the court. 
Under paragraph 12 of the lease, the Defen-
dants/.1\ppellants are entitled to attorneys fees as a 
reEult of trying a case for several days defending 
their position that the lease should be upheld and not 
forfeited. To deny Appellants their attorney's fees by 
finding them in default ignores the testimony of Doug 
Labrum, called by the Respondents, whose testimony 
clearly establishes, as preserved in the parti31 tran-
script, that .11.ppellants had cured the default within 
the 30-day grace period allowed by the lease, and prior 
-6-
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to the filing of suit. (P-3, §13; PT Labrum's testimo-
ny, seriatum, R-1 showing suit filed May 8, 1978) 
Yet another reason for denying Appellants' attor-
ney's fees is equally fallacious, that is, that they 
were not expended in establishing a breach of one of 
their leasehold rights by Respondent. One such right 
is stated in 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord & Tenant, §330, 
p.344 as follows: 
[T]he rule now established by nearly all courts is 
that the ordinary lease of realty, if valid, and 
executed by a person capable of making such a 
covenant, raises an implied covenant that the 
lessee shall have the quiet and peaceable pos-
session and enjoyment of the leased premises . . . 
unless there is some express covenant of a more 
limited character inconsistent with a judicial 
covenant of quiet enjoyment, an express stipu-
lation in the lease that nothing therein contained 
should be construed to imply a covenant for quiet 
enjoyment, or a statutory provision which is 
applicable to leases, abolishing implied cove-
nants. 
None of these exceptions to the established rule 
of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment apply in the 
instant case. No evidence was presented at trial to 
show that that lease was invalid or that it was not 
executed by a person capable of making a covenant of 
quiet enjoyment, nor is there any provision in the 
lease itself restricting lessees' right to quiet enjoy-
ment, and no Utah statute applicable to leases abolish-
es implied covenants in leases for real property. 
There is, therefore, in the lease before the court 
an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment of the leasehold 
premises, and in defending against Respondent Girard's 
attemot to forfeit their leasehold interest, Appellants 
were "clearly enforcing their rights pursuant to the 
terms of the lease as implied by law. As stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co., 
266 P. 1040 (Utah 1928): 
The written lease does not contain an express 
covenant of quiet enjoyment. It is, however, 
quite generally held that a covenant of quiet 
enjoyment by the lessors is implied in every lease 
for a term of years. Id. ~t 1042. 
The Hevwood case was cited for this same proposition in 
Sandall v. Hoskins, 137 P.2d 819 (Utah 1943), and this 
holding has never been reversed. 
-7-
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As Appellants successfullv defended their riahts 
of quiet enjoyment during tria~, they are entitled fo a 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in upholding their 
rights under the lease, and the sum of $2 ,000 as a 
reasonable sum for such attorney's fees was testified 
to at the trial and was not ob]ected to by counsel for 
Plaintiffs. Clearly, this amount should be awarded to 
Appellants, and assessed against the Respondent Girard. 
While the foregoing argument was addressed as set forth 
in appellants' brief as heretofore set forth, Chief ,Justice Hal! 
in the first full paragraph on page 2 of the Court's decisior, 
dated March 11, 1983, summarized the issues raised for disposi-
tion on appeal as follows: 
On this appeal, defendants challenge the award of 
attorney fees, contending that the court erred in 
reopening the case sua sponte for the purpose of 
permitting Girard to submit evidence omitted at the 
time of trial. Girard cross appeals, contending that 
the court erred in refusing to consider waste and 
health code violations as further evidence of breach, 
and that the court erred in denying her motion to amend 
the complaint at the time of trial, and erred in ruling 
that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acceptance 
of rent. 
Petitioners believe that this paragraph might more 
accurately have contained the following language, which is under· 
scored for clarification: 
On this appeal, defendants challenge the award of 
attorney fees, contending that the court erred in 
reopening the case sua sponte for the purpose of 
permitting Girard to submit evidence omitted at the 
time of trial and in denying Defendants' attorney's 
fees in sustaininq the lease against the remaining 
plaintiff, as testified to at trial by defendants' 
counsel. Girard cross appeals, contending that the 
court erred in refusing to consider waste and heal th 
code violations as further evidence of breach, and that 
the court erred in denying her motion to amend the 
complaint at the time of trial, and erred in ruling 
that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acceptance 
of rent. 
-8-
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It may be that Chief Justice Hall intended to resolve 
the issue of appellants' attorney's fees in his summary of the 
court's ruling on page 5 of the opinion as follows: 
The trial court's award of attorney fees is vacat-
ed and set aside. In all other respects, the judgment 
is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs. 
Nonetheless, as there was no discussion of the issue raised in 
the Court's opinion, it is unclear whether this Court in fact 
dealt with it. Petitioners believe that this Court, particularly 
by reason of its issuance of recent seminal rulings, has con-
tinually attempted to address and resolve all of the pertinent 
factual issues presented to it on appeal which are not otherwise 
resolved by inferences or rendered moot by other rulings. Other-
wise, however, this Court's own directive requires that judicial 
decision-making resolve those matters regarding which there are 
claimed errors in the lower court's rulings. See, by inference, 
Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 at 395 (Utah 
1980) • 
The peti ti one rs understand that this Court may deny 
their petition. The petitioners understand that this Court may 
deny their attorney's fees as testified to in the lower court in 
the event the Court accepts the petition. This petition, howev-
er, is made in good faith on the basis that it does not appear 
that the Court dealt with this issue on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioners seek a clarification of this Court's 
ruling, adverse or otherwise, on their request in their original 
brief for their attorney's fees as testified to at trial and 
-9-
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plead for in Point VI of their original brief on appeal. In al_ 
other particulars, the Court's original opinion is commendable 
for its thought and attention regarding the points raised by botr 
counsel. (i 
0 '/ ;~*-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~--- day of March, 1983. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the ~ clay of March, 
198 3, I mailed two copies of the above and foregoing APPELLANTS' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF ON PETITION FOR REHEARING to 
John L. Miles, attorney for plaintiff/respondent, P. O. Box 339, 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----00000-----




Charles L. Appleby, Jr., 
David E. Wood, Don Bjarnson, 
Catherine R. Appleby, Leone E. 
Wood, Grace Bjarnson, Steven 
Alfred, and Beth Alfred, 
Defendants, Appellants, 
and Cross-Respondents. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
No. 17662 
F I L E D 
March 11, 1983 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Plaintiffs Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Beth M. 
Smith and Salli Smith Girard brought this action to declare 
forfeiture of a lease on the ground that defendant lessees 
had failed to furnish liability insurance coverage as required 
by the terms of the lease. Plaintiffs also sought an injunction 
restraining defendants from conducting a health spa business 
on the leased premises until the required insurance coverage 
was obtained. Defendants stipulated that a temporary injunction 
might issue, and they also furnished the required insurance 
coverage. Subsequently, they stipulated that the temporary 
injunction might be made permanent, and all parties except 
plaintiff Girard further stipulated to the dismissal of all 
issues, and that each of the parties should bear their own 
attorney fees and costs. The trial court accepted the stipu-
lation and entered its order of partial dismissal, and the 
case proceeded to trial with only Girard as party plaintiff. 
On the morning of trial, Girard moved to amend the 
complaint to include causes of action for waste and for viola-
tions of the health and building codes. The court reserved 
ruling on the motion, but permitted evidence to be presented 
on those issues. 
The complaint contained a demand for an award of 
attorney fees incurred in enforcing the terms of the lease 
agreement, but Girard rested her case without presenting any 
evidence in support thereof, and without reserving the issue. 
The case was duly submitted, and in its subsequent 
written findings, conclusions and judgcent, the court ruled, 
inter alia, as follows: 1) denied the motion to amend the 
complaint, concluding that it was untimely and that the p:o-
posed amendment comprised new and different causes of action; 
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2) set aside its prior order of partial dismissal and joined 
the other plaintiffs as involuntary defendants, since all pl~~ 
tifs, being co-owners, had not agreed on a common course of 
action to waive the alleged forfeiture; 3) concluded that defeo. 
dants had breached the insurance covenant of the lease, but 
that the breach was not of sufficient substance as would justi' 
forfeiture, and that in any event, all plaintiffs had waived ·: 
the forfeiture by reason of their acceptance of rental pa~e~s 
following the breach; and 4) determined that plaintiffs were 
entitled to reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in enfor~ 
ing the insurance covenant, and ordered proof thereof by way 
of affidavits. On the basis of the affidavits thereafter sub-
mitted, the court awarded Girard the sum of $3,487.50 as and 
for attorney fees. 
On this appeal, defendants challenge the award of 
attorney fees, contending that the court erred in reopening 
the case sua sponte for the purpose of permitting Girard to 
submit evidence omitted at the time of trial. Girard cross-
appeals, contending that the court erred in refusing to consi~ 
waste and health code violations as further evidence of bru~. 
and that the court erred in denying her motion to amend the 
complaint at the time of trial, and erred in ruling that plain-
tiffs had waived forfeiture by the acceptance of rent. 
It lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to grant a motion to reopen for the purpose of taking 
additional testimony after fhe case has been submitted but , 
prior to entry of judgment. The court should consider such 
a motion in light of all the circumstances and grant or2deny it in the interest of fairness and substantial justice. Ho~ 
ever, no such discretion is afforded the court to reopen the 
case sua sponte. Preservation of the integrity of the adver-
sarial system of conducting trials precludes the court from 
infringing upon counsel's role of advocacy. Counsel is entitlec 
to control the presentation of evidence, and should there be 
a failure to present evidence on a claim a3 issue, it is 
generally viewed as a waiver of the claim. 
In the instant case, we are not apprised of the reum 
Girard saw fit to rest her case without presenting evidence 
in support of her claim for attorney fees. However, even if 
it be assumed that it was the result of oversight, the interests 
of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds its role 
as arbiter by reaching out and .deciding an issue that would 
otherwise4 be dead, it not having been litigated at the time of trial. 
1. _Lewis v. Porter, Utah, 556 P.2d 496 (1976). 
2. Id., citing 6A Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.), Sec. 
59.04[13) p. 59-37. 
3. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, Utah, 648 P.2d 
1382 (1982). 
4. See Dixon v. Stoddard, Utah, 627 P.2d 83 (1981). 
No. 17662 -2-
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Turning now to the merits of the cross-appeal, Girard 
concedes that the only claim for relief stated in the complaint 
is the failure to furnish evidence of insurance coverage. 
Nevertheless, she contends that the "Notice to Cure Defaults" 
which was attached to the complaint as an exhibit is sufficient 
to raise the issues of health and business code violations and 
waste. 
Girard relies upon Rule lO(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides, inter alia, that an exhibit to a 
pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. However, the fact 
that an exhibit becomes a part of the complaint does not satisfy 
the requirements of Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that a complaint "shall contain (1) a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for relief he deems him-
self entitled." 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part of a 
pleading to clarify or explain the same, an exhibit to a plead-
ing cannot serve the purpose of supplying necessary material 
averments, and the content of the exhibit is not tg be taken 
as part of the allegations of the pleading itself. 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits 
the amendment of pleadings by leave of court, and the rule is 
to be ligerally construed so as to further the interests of 
justice. However, the rule is to be applied with less 
liberality when the amendments a7e proposed during or after ~ 
trial, rather than before trial. In any event, the granting 
of leave to amend is a matter which lies within the broad dis-
cretion of the court, and its rulings are not to be disturbed 
in the absence of a showing of an abus5 of discretion resulting 
in prejudice to the complaining party. 
In the instant case, the motion to amend was not 
made until the day of trial, and it proposed to introduce new 
and different causes of action. Defendants objected to the 
granting of the motion, contending they would be prejudiced 
in their defense, not having been apprised of the new claims 
until the morning of trial. Thereupon, the court concluded 
as follows: 
[T]hat the matter of the other breaches 
was a significant change in the cause of 
action (which consumed most of the trial 
time), that it was not consented to be 
5. Hoover Equipment Company v. Smith, 198 Kan. 127, 422 P.2d 
914 (1967); see also 71 C.J.S. Pleading§ 375(2); 41 Am. Jur. 
Pleading § 56. 
6. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971). 
7. Id. 
8. Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P.2d 1132 (1936). 
-3- No. 17662 
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tried by defendant [sic], and that no 
reason was adduced for not timely moving 
to amend prior to trial. Accordingly, the 
court exercises its discretion under Rule 
15 to deny the motion to amend. 
In light of the facts and circumstances of this case 
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion ' 
to amend the complaint. Girard's inability to state an ade-
quate reason for the untimeliness of the motion discloses ~u 
this is not a case where "justice requires" an amendment. on 
the other hand, the disadvantage defendants would face if 
required to meet the new causes of action reveals that the 
interests of justice wi~l best be served by the court's denial 
of the motion to amend. 
We also find no merit in Girard' s remaining conten-
tion that the court erred in concluding that the forfeiture 
had been waived by the acceptance of rent. 
The ruling of the trial court follows the rule long 
recognized by this Court that: 
Where by reason of a breach of a condi-
tion, a lease becomes forfeited, the les-
sor is entitled to recover possession. 
He waives that right by the acceptance of 
rent. He cannot accept rent, and at the 10 same time claim a forfeiture of the lease. 
Nevertheless, Girard contends that her acceptance 
of rent did not constitute a waiver because the "Notice to 
Cure Defaults" heretofore mentioned contained a declaration 
that: "No waiver of this notice or the required thirty (30) 
days to cure the above-mentioned defaults will be granted u~m 
in writing and signed by all parties concerned." However, 
her contention is to no avail. 
In Wo~gland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, Inc., the Court concluded f~at such a unilateral 
reservation·avails the lessor nothing. 
9. Id. 
10. Brigham Young Trust Company v. Wagener, 13 Utah 236, 
44 P. 1030 (1896), cited with approval in Woodland Theatres, 
Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., Utah, 560 P.2d 700 
(1977). 
11 •. Supra n.10, at page 701. 
12 • .!_£.,citing with approval 3A Thompson on Real Property 
( 1959 Replacement), Sec. 1328, p. 576, 1976 Supplement, P· 74, 
which is now to be found in the 1981 Replacement, Sec. 1328, 
p. 585-86 • ./ 
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The trial court's award of attorney fees is vacated 
and set aside. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
Each party to bear their own costs. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Dallin H. Oaks, Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
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